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Abstract
This paper discusses some íssues in the empirical implementation of
game theoretic models of household labor supply. In particular we focus on
the identification problems inherent to many of these models. As an
illustration, we estimate a game theoretic model which uses data on
preferred working hours as additional identifying information.
z
1. Introduction
During the last decade the microeconometric literature on labor
supply has presented many extensions of the standard textbook model of a
utility maximizing individual choosing an optimal combination of leisure
and consumption. In particular much effort has been put in taking into
account the non-linearity or non-convexity of the budget set due to tex
and social security systems and to modelling the effect of institutional
constraints which restrict the choice set of the individual.
In addition, there is a tendency to extend models of individusl labor
supply to models of household labor supply; examples are the papers by
Hausman and Ruud (1984), Kooreman and Kapteyn (198~), Lundberg (1988) and
Ransom (198~). A motivation for developing household models rather than
individual models is that there is some evidence that the exogeneity
assumption on the variable 'other household income' (which includes labor
income of the spouse) in individual models is not always tenable; see
Smith and Blundell (1986) and Lundberg (1988). More importantly, it is
likely that there is a tight structural relation between the labor supply
decisions of the male and the female partner within a household, and to
understand this interrelationship, it should be taken into account
explicitly in setting up the empirical model.
One of the additional problema in modelling joint decisions of
household members is how to properly describe the decision making process
within the household. In empirical work researchers usually opt for e
straightforward extension of the individual labor aupply model by
specifying a utility function (or a duel representation) with male
leisure, female leisure and total household consumption as arguments. This
utility function is assumed to represent the preferences of the household
as a whole. Maximization subject to the household budget constraint then
yields a male and female labor supply function. However, if male and
female preferences differ, this approach is generally not acceptable (cf.
Samuelson (1956) and Brown end Chuang (1981)).
The literature on more general models of the household's labor supply
decision making process (mainly of the bargaining type) is characterized
by an abundance of theoretical refinements and very few empirical
applications. One of the problems in applied work is that it is not clear
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which of the many proposed solution concepts should be used in an
empirical model. In addition, the number of utility parameters to be
estimated will in principle be about twice as large as for models based on
a joint household utility function. The available data usually do not
contain sufficient ínformation to identify these parematers. A further
problem is that, except for some extremely reatrictive functional forms
and some specific choices of the solution concept, one can generally not
derive closed form expressions for the behavioral equations.
In Section 2 of this paper we review the existing literature on game
theoretic models of household labor supply. Section 3 discusses the
problems encountered in the empirical implementation in more detail. We
also indicate what kind of additional information would be necessary to
solve the identification problem inherent to many of these models. As an
illustration, Section 4 presents estimation results of a geme theoretic
model which uses data on preferred working hours as additional identifying
information. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2. Household decision making as a two person game; a review
We consider households with a male and a female partner who pool
their resources and allocate them jointly. Moreover, we confine ourselves
in this Section to the most common case in which only male and female
hours of work, male and female wage rates (for workers only), total
household consumption and total household non-labor income are observed.
The preferences of the i-th partner (i-m,f; m denotes male, F denotes
female) can be represented by a well-behaved utility function Ui(~m'~f'y)'
where ~m is male leisure, .~f is female leisure and y is total household
consumption. The utility function includes the possibility of egoistic
agents, in which case the leisure of one spouse does not directly affect
the utility of the other spouse. (In that case there will, of course,
still be an indirect effect through household consumption.).
Once the male and female labor supply are determined, household
consumption follows immediately from the household budget constraint
wmm r wf,~f. y- ~T.wfT t u-Y. (2.1)
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where wm and wf are the male and female wage rate, T is total time
endowment and u is non-labor income; Y is full household incomel).
The dictatorial point of the i-th partner is defined as the solution
of the maximizing Ui(~m,~f,y) subject to the household budget constraint
(2.1).
After eliminating y from the utility functions using the budget
constraint (2.1), the utility levels can be represented in the (~m'~f)-
plane; see Figure 1.
The solid curves around the dictatorisl point Df are the indifference
curves of the female partner, the dotted curves around Dm are the
indifference curves of the male partner. The farther an indifference curve
is removed from a dictatorial point, the lower is the utility level
corresponding to this curve. The line AB in Figure 1 is the conditional
demand function of the male partner, i.e. it represents the optimal male
leisure demand, given the leisure demand of the female ( reaction curve).
It connects all tangency points of horizontal lines with the indifference




Figure 1. Indifference contours and solution conceptsa)
Im
a) Figure 1 is based on Stone-Geary utility functions (see Section 3),
with ëm-ëf-ëy-5m-5f-Sy-G: Hm-acf-0.4; ~Bf-am-G.2 and wm-wf-1.
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Using Figure 1, we can graphically represent several allocations that
have been used in the literature. In an article in this Journal, Leuthold
(1968) estimated a model based on the assumption that each partner
maximizes his or her own utility function, given the labor supply of the
spouse. Using 'egoistic' Stone-Geary utility functions, she derived the
two reactions functions. Next, estimates were obtained by estimating the
reduced form of the reaction functions. This procedure is equivaleï~t to
employing a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, and is represented
graphically by the intersection point L of the reaction curves AB end CD.
As will be pointed out in Section 3, the assumption of egoistic agents is
redtindant as the model estimated by Leuthold is empirically
indistinguishable from one that does not make this assumption, at least in
the case of Stone-Geary utility functions. A similar model, though with
different functional forms, has been estimated by Ashworth and Ulph
(i981)2).
Figure 1 clearly visualizes the well-known fact that a non-
cooperative Nash-equilibrium is generally not Pareto-optimal; both
partners can improve by moving from L to, for example, P. As has been
argued by Manser and Brown (1980), it seems more appropriate ín a
household context to employ models which only yield Pareto-optimal
outcomes. The set of Pareto-allocations (i.e. the contract curve) can also
easily be visualized in Figure 1; all tangency points of indifference
curves around Dm with indifference curves around Df, between (and
including) both dictatorial points, represent Pareto-optimal allocations.





Equation (2.2) follows immediately from the first order conditions
for maximizing Vi(~m.~f) subject to V~(.Cm,,Cf)-V0 ( j~i), where VO
is some
given utility level. Alternatively, (2.2) can be obtained by maximizing
the function V defined by
V - W(Vm(,Lm.,tf) .Vf (~m.~f) ) (2.3)
Here W is a function that is increasing in both its arguments and that
does not depend on wm, wf or u. A special form of (2.3) is
~ - aVm~(1-a)Vf (2.3')
with OCa(1. Both (2.3) and (2.3') imply (2.2). Note that one can always
write the solution to maximization of (2.3) with respect to .~m and .Cf as
if it were the solution of maximization of (2.3') with a properly
specified ~.
The shaded area in Figure 1 is the set of allocations which are
better for both partners than the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium L. It
might be argved that only the intersection of this set end the contract
curve should be considered as potential equilibria. If e point on the
contract curve outside the shaded area i s reached, one of the players has
an incentive to behave non-cooperatively. The points Tf and Tm can
therefore be interpreted as threat points. Taking the existence of threat
points into account explicitly, the household's behavior can be described
by
max 'V - W(Vm(.~m,~f), Vf(~m.~f))
s. t. Vm(,~m,,tf) ) `YN(wm.wf,u)
Vf (,Zm.,Lf) ~ ~N(wm,wf.N)
(2.4)
Here `YN(wm,wf,H) and Y'N(wm'wf'u) denote the utility levels the
partners attain in the case of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. A
crucial difference between problems (2.3) and (2.4) is that the solution
to (2.4) will generally not satisfy Slutsky conditions. The same holds for
(2.3) with W dependent on wages or non-labor income. A special case of
(2.4), the Nash-bargaining model, has been studied by McElroy and Horney.
In particular, these authors have derived a so-called Nash generalization
of the Slutsky matrix. Their results are based on a general specification
of the threat points, not the ones given in (2.4); see McElroy and Horney
(1981) and McElroy (1988). In a more recently published paper [Horney and
8
McElroy (1988)~ some empirícal evidence in favor of their bargaining model
is presented.
Model (2.3) has no empirical implications over and above the Slutaky
conditions implied by the standard neoclasscial household labor supply
model. This follows immediately from (2.3), since this is nothing else
than a household utility function. Chiappori (1988) has considered model
(2.3) with W dependent on wm, wf and H3). He shows that in the general
case of non-egoistic agents this model has no paremetric implicationa for
the labor supply functions.
One of the factors that have hampered the empirical implementation of
models based on (2.3) or (2.4) is that in both cases it is generally
impossible to obtain closed form solutions for the behavioral equations.
Another crucial problem in this type of models, identification, is the
subject of the next Section.
3. Identification
Obviously, the weaker the assumptions that one is prepared to make on
the solution of the household bargaining problem, the weaker will be the
empirical implications. In the sequel of this paper, we will primarily
focus on models which are based on the mere assumption that household
choices are Pareto optimal. In terms of Figure 1, this means that the
household is assumed to choose a point on the contract curve between Dm
and Df. In terms of the models in the previous Section, this means that
the household is assumed to maximize (2.3'), with a independent of wages
and non-labor income. Note, however, that it is perfectly possible for A
to vary with other characteristics, such as age and education.
As noted before, these assumptions have no other implications than
the standard neoclassical properties. We will illustrate these points for
the Stone-Geary specification of indivídual preferences:
iJm(~m.~f.Y) - m.iog(~m-ém) ' a~B(~f-7f) ' ay.toó(Y-Yy) (3.1a)
Uf(~m.~f,Y) - m~:og(~m-bm) ~ P~6(~f-bf) ~ H~,~oB(Y-by) (3.1b)
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with ay-l-am-af and py-1-~m-~f.
Zn the case of male dictatorship the leisure demand functions are
given by
wi.ti - wiYi~ai(Y-wmYm-wfëf-Yy) i-m,f (3.2a)
and in the case of female dictatorship by
wi~i - wibi4Pi(Y-wmbm-wfbf-by) i-m,f (3.2b)
Both cases are of course empirically indistinguishable from each other and
from the traditional model with a joint household utility function.
The conditional demand equation for male leisure given female leisure
corresponding to (3.1a) is given by
a
wm~m - wmYmt 1-á (Y-wmYmw~fYy)
f
(3.3a)
Similarly, the conditional female leisure demand equation given male
leisure corresponding to (3.1b) reads
wf,.tf - wfbft 1~~ (Y-wm.Lm-wfbf by)
m
(3.3b)
Note that Yf and bm do not appear in these equations. Solving .~m and .Cf
from (3.3a) and (3.3b). we obtain the leisure demand equations
corresponding to the non-eooperative Nash-equtLibrium:
,ym(1-a) bfa(1-P) ( 1-R) l (Aby-Yy)
m~m - wm [ 1-aP J-wf L 1-aP ,}Y ~1-al~ J a~ 1-aP ]
( 3.4e)
bf(1-P) YmP(1-a) S(1-o~) P(aYy-by)
wf~f - wf[ 1-aP J-wmL 1-aR ,;Y[ 1-a~ J~L 1-aj3 J
(3.4b)
where a-am~(1-af) and p-pf~(1-gm). Inspection of (3.4) shows that one can
only identify am~(1-af), Sf~(1-pm), Ym. Yy. bf and by. First, this result
implies that the model using the additional assumption that spouses are
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egoistic ( i.e. af-~m-0), as in Leuthold (1968), is empirically
indistinguishable from the model without this assumption. Secondly, a test
of the non-cooperative Nash model against the traditional model would be
tantamount to testing only whether ~ry-by. Such a test is not likely to be
very powerful.
Applying (2.2) to derive the contract curve, we obtain
~f-ëf ~m(Y-Y )-~ wm(,Cm-Xm) ~f-bf Rm(Y-b )-A wm(.Cm-bm)
~ ~ af(Y-ëy)-~ywf( f-Yf) - ~ - Pf(Y-by)-Aywf( f-bf)
(3.5)
Equation (3.5) is an implicit expression in .~m and .Lf, defining a
nonlinear contract curve. If we make the additional assumption lri-bi(-~i)'
í-m,f,y, (3.5) can be simplified to
(ocf-Pf)wm(~m-Ttm)'(Am-am)wf(.Cf-nf)~(am~f-afsm)(Y-wmnm-wfnf-Ry)'0 (3.6)
Thus in that case the contract curve reduces to a linear segment in the
(~m'~f)-plane. Alternatively, this segment can be represented as:
~,~m - wmnm t {aamt(1-a)pm}(Y-wmnm-wf~f-8y) (3.78)
wf~Ef - wfnf ~ {aaf4(1-a)pf}(Y-wm~m-wfnfny) (3.7b)
for OCI~Cl. Now the marginal budget shares are weighted averages of the
marginal budget shares in the corresponding male and female dictatorial
equations. Without further restrictions, a can easily take on values which
imply an equilibrium outside the shaded area in Figure 1, i.e. such that
the inequality restrictions in (2.4) are violated. Rather than imposing
restrictions which would prevent this from happening, we will report the
number of cases in our empirical illustration where the allocation is
outside the shaded area (Section 4).
Zn this special case with ~ri-bi, the functional form of the demand
functions does not differ from the traditional LFS demand equations.
If ~ri~bi, the demand curves will differ. This is not at variance with the
earlier observation that, under the mere assumption of Pareto optimality,
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a game theoretic and a neoclassical model are empirically
indistinguishable. One can interpret the differences that arise as merely
a difference in assumptions about the functional form of the household
utility function.
Note that, having information on actuel working hours only, model
(3.~) is underidentified. The marginal budget shares contain five
structural parameters (am' af' ~m' ~f ~d a), whereas we would
only be
able to obtain estimates for tm-aam.(1-~)~m and Yf-~aft(1-a)~f'
In view of the underidentification that seems to be inherent in this
type of models a question that arises is what kind of additional
information would be necessary to identify all the parameters. McElroy
(1988) suggests that information on singles or divorced individuals might
be used to identify the individual preferences. This is an interesting
suggestion, although its empirical implementation is not without
difficulties. One of the problems is that it requires modelling household
formation and dissolution to take into account the selective nature of the
subsamples of singles and divorced people. It also requires the assumption
of invariance of preferences across marital statuses.
Another possibility is to use data that, in some way or another,
contain additional information on respondents' preferences. For example,
in the 1982 Dutch Labor Mobility Survey, respondents were asked how many
hours they would like to work at their current wage rate. In the following
Section we illustrate how these data can be used as additional identifying
information.
4. An empirical illustration
We start out from household utility function (2.3'), with a
independent oC wages and non-labor income, and the Stone-Geary
specification for individual preferences. In addition, we assume that the
partners agree on the level of the subsistence quantities in such a way
that the bargaining process is based on (3.1) with ~i and bi replaced by
ni-max(yi,bi), i-m,f,y. As shown in the previous Section, this assumption
implies that the contract curve is linear, which ellows us to derive
closed form expressions For the Pareto optimal leisure demand equations.
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The observed actuel working hours in the data are assumed to represent a
particular Pareto optimal outcome chosen by the household. Tacking on
additve error terms, we have the following actuel hours equations:
wm~m - wmnm . {aam~(1-a)Sm}(Y-wmnm-wfqf-~y) i em (4.1a)
wfif - wfnf 4 {~af.(1-~)~f}(Y-wmnm-wf~f-ny) ' Ef (4.1b)
The parameter ~ indicates which Pareto optimal outcome (i.e. which point
on the contract curve) is actually chosen by the household. In the extreme
cases we have male dictatorship (~-1) or female dictatorahip (~-0).
The identification problem can (partly) be solved by using additional
information on preferred hours. In the 1982 Dutch Labor Mobility Survey
respondents were also asked how many hours per week they would like to
work at their going wage rate. We assume that this variable is determined
exclusively on the basis of the respondent's own preferences. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that in the phresing of the
question there is no reference at sll to the partner's behavior or
preferences. Moreover, partners answered these questions separately4). It
should be noted, however, that nevertheless the individual might take
his~her partner's preferences into account to some extent when answering
the question. Also, the number of preferred hours may be affected by the
respondent's perception of what number of hours would be acceptable from
an employer's point of view. In that case, the answer may not only reflect
preferences, but possibly also factors related to the demand side of the
labor market.
Neglecting these possibilities, we have the following preferred hours
equations
~~m - wmym. am(Y-wmym-wf.ëf-~y) 4 Em
and
wfif - wfbfF ~f(Y-wmbm-wfbf-by) t ef
(4.2e)
(4.2b)
Equations (4.2) identify am' ~f' ym' yf' yy' bm, bf and by. Combined
with the information provided by the estimation of (4.1), we have four
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"reduced form" estimates (am' ~f' ~m-Aami(1-~)pm and tf-~aft(1-a))
and
five "structural" parameters (am' af' ~m' ~f ~d ~) for the marginal
budget share parameters. So, for complete identification, we need one
additional restriction. We choose ay-gy. If we would also have information
on how many hours a respondent would like his~her partner to work, for
exemple, no additional restriction would be necessary. In that case, the
preferred hours responses of the male partner would completely identify
the male utility function, wheras the female's preferred hours responses
would completely identify her utility function. The actusl hours would
then identify ~.
Assuming the error terms to be normally distributed with zero mean
and unrestricted covariance matrix ~, we estimate equations (4.1) and
(4.2) jointly by means of Maximum I.ikelihood, taking into account all
cross equations regtrictions, including r~i-max(~ri'bi)'
In the estimation only households are used where both the male and
the female partner work in a paid job for at least 15 hours per week. The
15 hours cut-off point is dictated by the survey design by which certain
items of information such as the number of preferred hours are not
collected for people who work less than 15 hours per week. As a result, we
analyze a subsample of 139 households for whom sufficient information has
been collected to be able to estimate the model. Some sample statistics
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Samale statisticsa)
mean s.d. min max
Male preferred hours 36.0 8.2 0 70
- actual hours 41.9 6.2 20 70
wage rate 13.2 3.8 7.6 28.9
Female preferred hours 25.8 8.2 12 50
actual hours 30.0 9.1 15 50
wage rate 9.5 1.5 6.3 14.4
Family non-labor income 17.2 30.1 0 140.6
a) Hours are per week, wages rates are in Dfl. per hour, non-labor income
is in Dfl. per week.
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In the estimation, the 15 hours sample selection rule has been taken
into account by maximizing the likelihood function
fl(~m'~f'~m'~f)
L - IT
n Of OJ f2(~m'~f)m~f
T-15 T-15 (4.3)
Here fn(~a .La ,Cp ,Lp) is the joint density function of ,Ca ,La ,Lp and ~p1 m' f' m' f m' f' m f
implied by (4.1) and (4.2) for the n-th household and f2(~m,~f) is the
joint marginal density function of ,~m and ~Cf for the n-th household.
The likelihood function is maximized using a quasi-Newton algorithm
which requires no (analytical) derivatives, as provided by the NAO-Library
(EDq14JBF). The (asymptotic) covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood
estimators is estimated by the inverse of the (numerically calculated)
Hessian of the min-doglikihood function.
The estimation results are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Estimation results












' b) 5436 . . .
~ - 0.08 loi7o .
-0.05 -0.08 14170
-o.i3 0.04 0.66 3961
a) T is set equal to 168 hours per week. The estimates of ri and bi
(i-m,f), however, are independent of the choice of T.
b) Diagonal elements are variances, off-diagonal elements are correlation
coefficients
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In the first place, we note that the estimated a's, p's and a fall
between zero and one, as they should. As has been noted before, the
utility functions (3.1) are only well-defined if the observed quantities
exceed the subsistence quantities. We have checked per observation point
whether these conditions are satisfied; see Table 3.
Table 3. Percentage observations satisY'ying reguiarity conditions
óm Xf óy bm bf by
Preferred hours 98 55 98 96 55 7~
Actual hours 89 41 100 82 41 89
In view of the restrictive functional forms of the labor supply
eyiaations implied by the additive utility functions (3.1) the numbers in
Table 3 look reasonable.
For households for which regularity for actual hours is satisfied, we
have checked whether the Pareto optimal solution falls within the shaded
area, i.e. we have checked whether the inequalities in (2.4) are
satisfied. This turns out to be the case for all households but
two.
Although it is tempting to interpret the estimated a as an indication
of the relative bargaining power of the spouses in the decision regarding
joint labor supply, it should be borne in mind that this result is likely
to be sensitive to the identifying assumptions that have been imposed.
Moreover, the estimated standard error of a is relatively large. Therefore
we shall abstain from an interpretation of a in terms of relative power.
Finally, we have tested whether the utility functions of both spouses
are significantly different. Since we have already assumed ay-~6y, the null
hypothesis of equal utilíty functions becomes am- Sm' ~m-bm' yf-Sf
and y-b . On the basis of a Wald test, the hypothesis is




The empirical implications of Pareto optimal behavior by household
members are limited. The reason is simply that Pareto optimal behavior can
generally be rationalized by the maximization of some household social
welfare function. In many instances this social welfare function is
indistinguishable from a standard neoclassical utility Function and hence
restrictions on observable behavior are equivalent to Slutsky conditions.
Only if additional assumptions are made, for instance that the social
welfare function is dependent on prices, like in the approach by McElroy
and Horney (1981), then implications are different from the standard
neoclassical model. Even then the interpretation of the implications is
ambiguous. For example, the McElroy and Horney approach could be viewed as
neoclassical with price dependent preferences (cf. Pollak (19~~)).
Where it is now generally recognized that identification of
competing paradigms solely on the basis of functional forms is too shaky a
basis for inference, the only alternative is to invoke more information.
In this paper we have used such additional information in the form of each
spouse's preferred hours. Even then complete identification of the model
turned out not to be quite possible.
The empirical part of the paper has been purely illustrative.
Clearly, if one takes bargaining approaches to the explanation of
household behavior seriously, then more solid information on each spouse's
preferences is required. For the empirical worker this means that the
usual data sources are no longer sufficient. The content of surveys of
labor supply will have to be increased.
Footnotes
1) Some papers have proposed a framework in which the decision making
within households and household formation are determined simultaneously.
In this paper we will confine ourselves to studying the decision making
process within the household, given its existence.
2) Non-cooperative equilibrium concepts have also been used by Bjorn and
Vuong (1984, 1985), who estimate discrete game theoretic models of
household labor force participation.
3) There is one slight distinction. He distinguishes male and female
consumption, so that consumption is not a public good. Since, however, the
"relative price" of male and female consumptionis always equal to one
there is no loss of generality in combining male and female consumption
from the start.
4) The phrasing of the question was as follows: "Suppose your income per
hour would remain the same. How many hours per week would you like to work
in your present job?"
5) The Wald statistic follows a x2-distribution with 4 degrees of
freedom. The critical levels for 5z and 2.5X are 9.49 and 11.1,
respectively. The statistic 1s computed at 4~.7.
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